JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN NEW JERSEY: A PRELUDE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFORM?
The New Jersey Supreme Court in the two landmark decisions
P,T&L Construction Co. v. Commissioner, Department of Transportation' and Willis v. Department of Conservation and Economic
Development2 took the initiative away from the state legislature and
abolished, at least in part, the doctrine of sovereign immunity in New
Jersey. Utilizing the trend of immunity law in this state and the effect
of similar holdings in other states, this comment will both delineate
the present status of New Jersey law in this area and offer predictions
as to its future course.
THE HOLDINGS OF

P,T&L AND Willis

P,T&L involved a suit against the state on a written contract for
public construction, the claim being for $110,360.64 withheld by the
state as damages for alleged delay in job completion. After the trial
court sustained the state's defense of immunity, 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court certified plaintiff's appeal before the appellate division
heard argument. 4 In a brief decision, the court held that "the judiciary should entertain actions against the State on contracts it makes," 5
thus judicially abrogating immunity of the state in contract cases.
Strobel Steel Construction Co. v. State Highway Commission,6 upholding sovereign immunity in a similar factual situation, was expressly
overruled.7
Pointing out that only the legislature can appropriate funds for
settling monetary judgments, the court decided that the critical question was
whether the judiciary should declare the dollar obligation of the
State even though payment will depend upon whether the Legislature will abide by the court's judgment and pay it.s
1 55 N.J. 341, 262 A-2d 195 (1970).
2 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
3 55 N.J. at 342, 262 A.2d at 196.
4 Id.
5 Willis v. Dept. of Cons. and Ec. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 536, 264 A.2d 34, 35 (Chief
Justice Weintraub alluding to the opinion he authored in P,T&L).
6 120 N.J.L. 298, 198 A. 774 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938).
7 55 N.J. at 343, 262 A.2d at 196.
8 55 N.J. at 344, 262 A.2d at 197.
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Citing several decisions 9 reflecting a past willingness of the court to
entertain actions against the state, Chief Justice Weintraub concluded
that the courts should "decide what was just as between the State and
a civil litigant."' 0
Since none of the cited cases declared that state funds were owed
to the plaintiff purely upon common law grounds," the court's resolution of the critical question was a more radical departure from existing
New Jersey law than a cursory reading of the opinion would reveal.
The court's election to declare an obligation that, absent a legislative
appropriation, would be unenforceable was justified on three grounds:
I) "The immunity concept is judge-made," thus implying that it can
be "judge-unmade"; 2) legislative inaction should not prompt the judiciary to "withhold its hand on a mere assumption that its coordinate
branches would want it that way"; and 3) other jurisdictions have ar2
rived at the same conclusion.1
Less than two months after the P,T&L decision, the court, again
through Chief Justice Weintraub, made its second major immunity
pronouncement in Willis v. Department of Conservation and Economic Development.13 The action was brought to recover damages
for injuries to Tomi Willis, an infant who suffered a traumatic amputation of her arm while feeding a caged bear at High Point Park, a
recreational facility of the state. On motion the trial court entered
judgment for the defendant based upon the plea of sovereign immunity,14 but the appellate division reversed, one judge dissenting. 15 The
reversal was based on a statute1 6 which gave the High Point Park
9 O'Neill v. State Hwy. Dept., 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967); East Orange v. Palmer,
47 N.J. 307, 220 A.2d 679 (1966); Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 219 A.2d 512 (1966);
Haycock v. Jannarone, 99 N.J.L. 183, 122 A. 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923); Amantia v. Cantwell, 89 N.J. Super. 7, 213 A.2d 251 (App. Div. 1965).
10 55 N.J. at 345, 262 A.2d at 198.
11 One of the cases involved a constitutional right to payment based upon the state's
power to take land under eminent domain providing just compensation is paid therefor.
Haycock v. Jannarone, 99 N.J.L. 183, 122 A. 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923). Another dealt
with a statutory provision that required payment to a party in plaintiff's situation.
Amantia v. Cantwell, 89 N.J. Super. 7, 213 A.2d 251 (App. Div. 1965). Two others were
based upon a claim for a declaration of rights rather than a monetary judgment. O'Neill
v. State Hwy. Dept., 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967); East Orange v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 307,
220 A.2d 679 (1966). The fifth resulted in the upholding of immunity, although it was
clearly indicated that, had the facts been different, an evaluation of the entire concept
might have been undertaken. Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 219 A.2d 512 (1966).
12 55 N.J. at 346, 262 A.2d at 198.
13 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970).
14 Id. at 535, 264 A.2d at 35.
15 Id. at 536, 264 A.2d at 35.
16 N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:5-2. The statute was repealed by L. 1945, ch. 22, § 44 (Feb.

21, 1945).
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Commission power to sue and be sued. The majority decided "that
when in 1945 the Commission went out of existence and its functions
were transferred to a department of the State ... the transfer carried
17
with it the same consent to suit."
After dismissing that holding as erroneous, the supreme court
proceeded to decide the larger question, namely, "whether the judiciary should continue to refuse to pass upon the State's tort liability
in the absence of a statute consenting to that course.""' Answering
the question in the negative, the court pointed out that other states
had reached the same result, 19 that tort liability immunity of New
Jersey municipalities had already been severely limited, 20 and that
immunity from liability in contract cases had been abrogated at the
state level. 21 Furthermore, the reaction of the state legislature was
22
viewed as one of approval.
The abrogation of immunity was not complete, for limitations
were carefully delineated. First,
the State will not be held liable for legislative or judicial action or
inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a legislative or
judicial cast, nor generally with respect to decisions calling for
the exercise of official judgment or discretion. 23
Chief Justice Weintraub noted that the court had invoked the same
limitation with respect to municipal corporation liability. 24 Second,
17 55 N.J. at 536, 264 A.2d at 35.

18 Id.
19 55 N.J. at 538, 264 A.2d at 36 (citing Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) and Stone v. Arizona Hwy. Comm., 93 Ariz. 384,
381 P.2d 107 (1963).
20 Id. at 539, 264 A.2d at 36.
21 Id. at 536, 264 A.2d at 35 (referring to the P,T&L decision).
22 Id. at 538-39, 264 A.2d at 36.
On the legislative side, suits have been authorized against corporate agencies of
the State, and the Legislature has not disapproved our holding in Taylor v. New
Jersey Highway Authority . . . that the consent to suit included consent to
liability upon judge-made principles of tort law. In addition, tort claims are
regularly considered by a subcommittee of the Joint Legislative Appropriations
Committee, although the modest sums appropriated do suggest, on their face at
least, a restrained approach with respect to damages....
• . . Again, it should be noted that the Legislature has not disapproved the doctrine that municipal corporations are suable in tort matters, nor, with one
exception, the rules of substantive law applied to them.
23 Id. at 540, 264 A.2d at 37.
24 Id. at 540-41, 264 A.2d at 37.
This limitation seems to be uniformly accepted, as we pointed out in Hoy v.
Capelli, [48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966)], and Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cligside Park, [48 N.J. 214, 225 A.2d 105 (1966)]. In those cases, we invoked the same
limitation with respect to the liability of municipal corporations. See also
Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, [42 N.J. 541, 201 A.2d 726 (1964)]; Fahey v.
City of Jersey City, [52 N.J. 103, 244 A.2d 97 (1968)]; Bergen v. Koppenal, [52 N.J.
478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968)]; Miehl v. Darpino, [53 N.J. 49, 247 A.2d 878 (1968)].
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. the decision to hear tort claims against the state is not to be applied
retroactively except as to the plaintiffs in the instant case. 25 It was
here that the court forced the legislature to make its position clear.
January 1, 1971 was set as the effective date of the decision, by which
time the court apparently hoped for some sort of legislative action.
In the event that the message was not clear enough, some suggestions
26
were presented.
NEW

JERSEY CASE LAW BEFORE

P,T&L

AND

Willis

State
In the absence of a statutory enactment conferring upon a litigant
the power to bring suit against the state for damages, no such action
was maintainable without the state's aquiescence in spite of the court's
attempt in P,T&L to find a precedent. 27 The immunity was applied
whenever a suit would have controlled state action or would have subjected the state to liability,2 even indirectly as in a suit against a
state agency. 29 The judiciary, in order to impose liability, had been
forced to resort to statutory construction" to find a waiver of immunity.
Sovereign immunity was not absolute when money was not in
issue. For example, that doctrine was held not to bar suits to mandamus
25 Id. at 541, 264 A.2d at 37-38.
26 [T]he Legislature may wish to require timely notice of claims to permit an

opportunity to investigate. Or the Legislature may choose to fix a monetary limit
on recoveries, or to exclude some category of damages, or to adopt a concept of
liability different from that of the common law, or to entrust the whole matter
to an administrative agency.
Id. at 541, 264 A.2d at 38.
27 Cases cited note 11 and accompanying text supra.
28 E.g., Gallena v. Scott, I1 N.J. 231, 94 A.2d 312 (1953).
Where the substantial rights of the State would be directly and adversely
affected if there were judgment according to the demand made, the State is a
necessary party defendant, and if it cannot be made a party, for want of consent
to be sued, then the suit is not maintainable. . . . The question is whether the
suit is in reality against the State itself, as a means of controlling its action or
imposing a liability.
Id. at 237, 94 A.2d at 315.
29 Duke Power Co. v. Patten, 20 N.J. 42, 118 A.2d 529 (1955). See also the later cases
of O'Neill v. State Hwy. Dept., 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967) (suit against Commissioner of State Highway Department); Hall v. Alampi, 47 N.J. 60, 219 A.2d 330 (1966)
(action against Secretary of Agriculture and Director of Plant Industry).
80 See, e.g., Taylor v. New Jersey Hwy. Auth., 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 315 (1956) where
the court allowed a suit against the New Jersey Highway Authority based upon the
express statutory provision establishing the Authority that it shall have the power to
sue and be sued in its own name.
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an official to perform a ministerial duty.81 Also, in O'Neill v. State
Highway Department,8 2 the court held that
[a] suit to settle title to property does not collide with considerations upon which the State's immunity from suit now rests. The
to compel the Legisprivate claimant does not ask the judiciary 33

lature or the Chief Executive to do anything.

The state was also found to be without immunity where the plaintiff
34
sought to restrain the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
Although the holdings of earlier state cases gave little indication
of the judicial discontent with the traditional sovereign immunity
concepts, there was dictum evidencing the court's disapproval of that
doctrine and its willingness, given the proper case, to reconsider the
entire concept:
We think the case before us is not the one in which to explore the
power of the Court to enter that area [governmental immunity]
or the wisdom of doing so. The reason is that the thesis of the
claim of liability is itself too doubtful.3 5
In fact, one authority, after reviewing the decision in McCabe v. New
Jersey Turnpike Authority,3 6 which held that the defendant was liable
when snow and ice fell from a bridge on plaintiff's car, stated that the
decision sounded "like a preliminary to a full-fledged overruling of
sovereign immunity." 3' 7 Although the prognostication was premature,
31 Jersey City v. Zink, 133 N.J.L. 437, 44 A.2d 825 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945).
50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967).
Id. at 316, 235 A.2d at 6.
34 Abelson's Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 75 A.2d 867
(1950).
A suit to restrain a state agency of the particular class from executing an
unconstitutional statute ... is not one designed to control the action of the State
or to subject it to liability within the principle of sovereign immunity from
suit.
Id. at 417, 75 A.2d at 869.
35 Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 109, 219 A.2d 512, 514 (1966) (emphasis added). In
this case plaintiff's decedent was killed when a piece of coficrete was thrown from an overhead crossing constructed by the State Highway Department. Plaintiff contended that the
state was negligent in constructing the overpass when it failed to erect wire fences to
prevent such criminal activity. The court denied recovery and refused to reconsider the
immunity concept since the decision not to put up a fence was a discretionary one. Under
P,T&L and Willis the same conclusion would undoubtedly be reached.
36 35 N.J. 26, 170 A.2d 810 (1961).
37 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 25.01 (1965 supp.) at 98. The conclusion reached by Professor Davis is a bit surprising since the court's reason for predicating
liability was based on a weighing of a number of factors which, in combination, indicated
a waiver of immunity by the state. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:23-5 empowers the Turnpike
Authority to sue and be sued. Furthermore, the Authority had passed a bond resolution
32

33
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the rulings in P, T&L and Willis did abrogate immunity as fully as
any other jurisdiction. Whether the legislature will allow the decisions
to stand is another matter.
Municipal
Municipal immunity from suit in New Jersey was first announced
in the landmark decision of Freeholders of Sussex v. Strader s in 1840.
This immunity, unlike that of the state, has gradually been eroded.
Municipalities were regarded to be agents of the state in the performance of some functions and thus could partake of the state's sovereignty. 39 In other respects they acted as private individuals and could
be held liable in the same way. 40 Because of this conceptual distinction, the governmental vs. proprietary function dichotomy was born.
The result was confusion:
In few, if any, branches of the law have the courts labored more
abjectly under the supposed inexorable domination of formulas,
phrases and terminology, with the result that facts have often
been tortured into the framework of a formula, lacking in many
cases any sound basis of reason or policy. This is notably the case
in the effort to apply the supposedly settled rule that the municipal
requiring it to carry liability insurance to handle claims arising from Turnpike operations. The holding of the court, therefore, was not novel, even for New Jersey.
38 18 N.J.L. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1840). For a comprehensive summary of New Jersey case
law on the immunity of municipalities as of 1934, see Weintraub and Conford, Tort
Liability of Municipalities in New Jersey, 3 MERCER BEASLEY L. REV. 142 (1934). For
a survey of the law in this area as of 1969, see Note, Municipal Tort Liability: An
Emerging Standard in New Jersey, 1 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 69 (1969).
39 See Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
None of the civil divisions of the State-its counties, cities, towns and villageshas any independent sovereignty. . . . The legal irresponsibility heretofore enjoyed by these governmental units was nothing more than an extension of the
exemption from liability which the State possessed.
Id. at 365, 62 N.E.2d at 605. To the same effect, Chief Justice Weintraub stated in Cloyes
v. Delaware Tp., 23 N.J. 324, 129 A.2d 1 (1957):
The doctrine of municipal immunity originated in judicial decisions since
the separation of the Colonies from England. . . . The immunity is confined
to those activities which the municipality undertakes as the agent of the State as
distinguished from those which it pursues in its corporate or proprietary capacity.
Id. at 327, 129 A.2d at 2. See also Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J.
129 (1924).
Yet, while autonomous in many respects, the city is still for some purposes an
agent of the state. How sound in theory this segregation of function as an agency
of state government now is may be questioned, although its historical basis is not
subject to doubt.
Id. at 131.
40 Weintraub and Conford, supra note 38, at 144:
It is now definitely settled that where a municipality embarks upon a venture
from which it derives some special benefit or advantage in its corporate capacity,
it is liable as fully and completely as any private individual similarly engaged.
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corporation is not liable for torts committed by its agents in the
performance of governmental, political or public functions, whereas
it is liable when the tort is committed in the performance of cor41
porate, private or ministerial functions.
Even if the municipality was involved in a governmental function, it could still be held liable for active wrongdoing as opposed to
passive negligence. This proposition was first announced in Hart v.
Freeholders of Union42 in 1894:
There is no reason arising out of public policy why municipal
corporations should be shielded from liability when a private
injury is inflicted by their wrongful acts, as distinguished from
mere negligence. The grounds on which the exemption has been
43
rested in the one class of cases are inapplicable to the other class.
The governmental vs. proprietary function and active wrongdoing vs. passive negligence tests have both recently fallen into disrepute
with our courts. 44 They have been replaced by a new rule which allows the municipality to claim immunity only when it was engaged
in the exercise of official discretionary duties. 45 Since there was no
Borchard, supra note 39, at 129.
57 N.J.L. 90, 29 A. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
43 Id. at 93, 29 A. at 491. See also the more recent cases of Caporossi v. Atlantic City,
220 F. Supp. 508 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 328 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825
(1964); Leemon v. South Jersey Port Comm., 145 F. Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1956); Hoy v.
Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966); Hayden v. Curley, 34 N.J. 420, 169 A.2d 809
(1961); Hartman v. City of Brigantine, 23 N.J. 530, 129 A.2d 876 (1957); Casale v. Housing
Auth., 42 N.J. Super. 52, 125 A.2d 895 (App. Div. 1956).
44 See, e.g., B.W. King, Inc. v. West New York, 49 N.J. 318, 230 A.2d 133 (1967) where
the court stated:
In fixing municipal liability for torts there has been a more or less blind adherence to the municipal proprietary-governmental distinction, without a real consideration of the reasons which gave birth to that doctrine and of whether, in
the light of the general expansion of municipal activity, the doctrine has not
outlived its usefulness....
41
42

Rather than to base liability upon a finding that the municipality's function
. . . was either proprietary or governmental and to compound the confusion,
we prefer . . . [not to] add to the perpetuation of the controversial dichotomy.
Id. at 324-26, 230 A.2d 136-37. See also Jackson'v. Hankinson, 51 N.J. 230, 238 A.2d 685
(1968) regarding the active wrongdoing vs. passive negligence test.
[A]lthough there has thus far been no express and complete disavowal of active
wrongdoing termin6logy, there has been a shift towards frank recognition that
municipal entities, along with all others, should justly be held accountable for
injuries resulting from their tortious acts and omissions under ordinary principles of negligence ....
Id. at 235, 238 A.2d at 688.
45 Jackson v. Hankinson, 51 N.J. 230, 238 A.2d 685 (1968). The landmark decision
announcing complete municipal immunity for discretionary acts was Amelchenko v.
Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541, 201 A.2d 726 (1964). For a survey of other cases elab-
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problem of separation of powers, it is not surprising that the judiciary
was more willing to render judgments against municipalities. Because
legislative action was not necessary to effect the satisfaction of a money
judgment, the court had no reason to fear that its pronouncements
would be merely "idle declarations". Under Willis the discretionary
rule now applies as to torts committed by the state, arrived at without
the confusing intermediary doctrines that permeated the field of municipal immunity for so many years.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

New Jersey law has been drastically changed by the decisions under discussion. However, the question arises whether this change is
more or less permanent or merely a step in the development of New
Jersey immunity concepts. The reaction of other jurisdictions following similar holdings may provide an answer.
Professor Davis, in his treatise on Administrative Law, states:
Sovereign immunity in state courts is on the run. State courts
are taking the offensive against it. The development during the
period 1957-1965 is deep and dramatic. The movement seems to
be gaining momentum. 4"
It is not only the judiciary which is responsible for the development.
In the words of Professor Van Alstyne, consultant to the California
Law Revision Commission:
[T]he impetus for a statutory restructuring of governmental tort
responsibility in many states has been derived from an appellate
decision abrogating, either wholly or partially, existing tort immunities of governmental bodies. Elsewhere, however, the legislature
has itself assumed the initiative and has enacted substantial statutory departures from
preexisting immunity, without the stimulus of
47
a judicial prod.
orating on the discretionary rule in New Jersey see Note, Municipal Tort Liability: An
Emerging Standard in New Jersey, 1 RUTGERS CAMNDEN L.J. 69, 84-85 (1969).
46 Davis, supra note 37, at 95. See also Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26,
115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) which contains precedent from numerous jurisdictions in support
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision to judicially abolish sovereign immunity in that
state. The Holytz case parallels the New Jersey cases under discussion not only by making
liability the rule and immunity the exception, but also by extending an invitation to
the legislature to act in the form of a prospective application of the rule. Exceptions for
discretionary functions were also delineated as in New Jersey.
47 Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.
FORUM 919, 920-21. See also Lawyer, Birth and Death of Governmental Immunity, 15
CLEVE.-MAR. L. REy. 529 (1966).
While legislative action, as a solution to this problem, would give more uni-
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In his article, Professor Van Alstyne surveys fourteen jurisdictions
where sovereign immunity has been swept away in whole or in part.48
In only two has the impetus come from the legislature, 49 though in
six it responded to judicial decisions with a pronouncement of its
own.50 Of the six, California's statute is deemed to be the most comprehensive and could serve as a guideline for other jurisdictions: 51
Although these documents [the Law Revision Commission's pamphlets] are focused on California, the thinking will be of great
usefulness to all states confronted with the problem of sovereign
responsibility. The quality of the California studies is very high,
and they push forward the frontier of understanding. 52
Noting that judicial abrogation of immunity has, at least in half
of the jurisdictions, been followed by legislative action makes clear
what the court in Willis was hoping for when it postponed the effect
of the decision to 1971. The legislature was invited to make its position clear, hopefully in line with the court's.
Curiously, in P,T&L the court did not declare that its ruling
would only be prospective, apparently with the intent to allow suit
on any contract not barred by the statute of limitations. The legislature, fearful that a flood of litigation would inundate the courts, responded with a statute which delays the effect of the P,T&L and Willis
rulings to July 1, 197 1.53 That action may be indicative of the legislature's willingness to respond with a comprehensive enactment.5
formity to subsequent case decisions, it appears that most state legislatures are
reluctant to take this responsibility until prodded into action by the courts. The
courts, therefore, must take the initiative as an impetus to obtaining appropriate
legislation.
Id. at 549.
48 Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
49 Connecticut and Utah.
50 California, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, and Wisconsin.
51 Van Alstyne, supra note 47, at 973-74:
The California Tort Claims Act ... is the most comprehensive, detailed, and
sophisticated enactment dealing with governmental tort liability in any jurisdiction . ..
The principal feature of the California statute . . . is its basic determination
to make all phases of governmental tort liability and immunity a matter of
statutory regulation, thereby precluding judicial development of the new common law approaches to new or emerging problems.
52 Davis, supra note 37, § 25.17 at 118.
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4A-1 (1970).
54 For example, California's judicial abrogation of immunity was followed by a
statute which delayed the effect of the rulings for two years. By the time the decisions
were to go into effect, the legislature had effectuated its comprehensive statute.
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Retention of immunity for discretionary functions also falls in line
with the mainstream of legal development.
It is obvious that governmental tort immunity is far from dead,
although to a considerable degree it is now being re-translated as a
"discretionary function" immunity....
What is occurring is, quite obviously, not the total demise of
the long-criticized irresponsibility of public bodies for their torts,
but a restructuring of the rules which determine when a tort committed by governmental action is compensable. 55
THE FUTURE OF SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY IN NEW JERSEY

As a result of the new pronouncements, sovereign liability is the
rule in New Jersey and immunity the exception. Absent a legislative
declaration, it will be up to the courts to more precisely define and
shape the immunity concept on a case by case basis. The prospect of
such an undertaking has caused the authors of one article to lament:
Continued abdication of legislative responsibility in this area will
ultimately, it is felt, compel judicial abrogation of government
immunity with all its attendant problems, and it is in an effort to
avoid the crisis which would necessarily result from such an unfortunate exercise of judicial power that the following presentation is made. 56
The principal objection to judicial handling of the problem is
that the courts, deciding cases on an ad hoc basis on the strength of
issues selected and argued by the adversaries, may be inherently unsuited for the task of establishing a comprehensive, well reasoned, and
effective ultimate doctrine. 57 Moreover, ad hoc decisions unavoidably
55 Van Alstyne, supra note 47, at 975, 979.

56 S. Napolitano & G. Kenny, The Status of Sovereign Immunity in New Jersey: A
Proposed Legislative Reform, 91 N.J.L.J. 429, 438 (1968).
57 See Davis, supra note 37, § 25.18:
[O]n some aspects of the problem the courts need legislative assistance, as the
elaborate study by the California Law Revision Commission shows ....
Even in
New York, where the law of sovereign responsibility is mostly judge-made, some
inadequacies result from lack of legislative assistance.
Id. at 126. Not all authorities view the legislature as the proper source for setting down
guidelines for governmental responsibility. For example, in Kelso v. City of Tacoma,
63 Wash. 2d 913, 390 P.2d 2 (1964), the Supreme Court of Washington stated:
[R]econsideration of common-law doctrine on an ad hoc basis-which of course
is stare decisis in the best and most enlightened sense and, historically, is the
modus operandi of the common law-could be less jarring in effect and, per-
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entail undesirable uncertainty for parties who become involved in a
factual situation not previously before the court. However, there is
another side to the coin. A codified solution frequently includes an
unwanted lack of flexibility. Even the most thoroughly considered
enactment cannot anticipate every situation.
Whether in response to the prompting of our highest court 58 or
not, the legislature has seen fit to begin a study in this area. Chief
Justice Weintraub in the Willis case stated:
[A]fter we expressly held open in Fitzgerald v. Palmer ... the question whether the judiciary should entertain such suits, the Legislature adopted L. 1967, c. 20. There, after reciting that "Recent
decisions of the courts of this State interpreting the statutory and
case law concerning governmental immunity in negligence actions
have indicated the need for a thorough review of the law in this
field," the Legislature authorized the Attorney General to study
"the present general provisions of the statutes and case law relating
to governmental immunity of the State, of counties and municipalities to respond in damages for the negligence of their agents or
servants; and to report to the Legislature the results of such study,
together with recommendations for amendments and additions
to existing statutes intended to modernize procedures relating
thereto." The statute reflects the feeling we share, that something
positive should be done. 59
Other activity was also undertaken:
The Legislature has also created a legislative commission to study
the necessity for and the feasibility of establishing a court of claims
in the judicial branch of State government to replace and supersede
the functions of the Subcommittee on Claims of the Joint Legislative Appropriations Committee with the passage of Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 30 of this year. The members of this commission have been appointed, but the commission has yet to
organize and begin operation. .

.

. It is expected that this commis-

sion will begin operation shortly, and that it will call upon the
Attorney General's Office for a report on the study authorized by
P.L. 1967, c. 20, and for further assistance in its work. Because of
haps, could be accomplished with more consistency and finesse than if undertaken
by less deliberate and more embracing or inclusive legislative action.
Id. at 920, 390 P.2d at 7 (concurring opinion). One factor to keep in mind is that judicial judgments alone cannot force appropriations and payments to the successful litigant.
Legislative acquiescence is necessary and if done only on an individual statute basis, it
would, in effect, amount to a second retrial of the case, this time by the legislative body.
Possible arbitrariness is apparent. A statute authorizing the setting aside of funds for
any judgments against the state would be far more equitable.
58 47 N.J. at 109, 219 A.2d at 513-14.
59 55 N.J. at 538-39, 264 A.2d at 36.
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the status of both studies, there are no results or recommendations

to date. 60

Although the judiciary's preferred rule was clearly indicated in
P,T&L and Willis, the invitation to the legislature was obvious. The
establishment of the investigatory commission suggests that action
will be forthcoming. 61 Whether the legislature will respond with a
blanket waiver of immunity where liability is complete subject to
judicial exceptions as in New York, 2 or a waiver of immunity subject
to legislatively imposed exceptions as in most states, 63 or an act with
specifically defined liabilities and immunities as in California, 64 is
within the legislature's discretion. A short but fairly comprehensive
act proposed for New Jersey and intended to head off judicial action
precisely in the nature of the P,T&L and Willis cases was published
in 1968.65 The proposal is broken down into two areas, contract and
tort. Complete liability for contracts is recommended, as long as the
"requirements concerning bidding procedures and other prerequisites
to a valid contract" 6 are met. In the area of tort, a complete reaffirmation of immunity is sought, subject to legislative exceptions. This
part of the proposed statute, therefore, is at variance with the majority
of jurisdictions.
A traditional complaint, that weakening of immunity results in
dissipation of public funds, appears to be less than a formidable obstacle.
60 Letter from Thomas P. Bryan, Research Associate of the Law Revision and
Legislative Services, Division of Legislative Information and Research, which is headed
by Mr. Samuel A. Alito, Sept. 16, 1970.
61 See Van Alstyne, supra note 47, discussing the effect of Spanel v. Mounds View
School District, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
The change in state law announced by the decision was declared to be strictly
prospective, applying only to injuries accruing after the adjournment of the
next regular session of the Minnesota Legislature. The 1963 session seized the
invitation, and produced a comprehensive statutory revision of governmental
tort law. (emphasis added)
Id. at 950. (That case only effected immunity of municipalities, but the comparison is
still valid.)
62 N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 1 et seq. (McKinney 1963).
63 Van Alstyne, supra note 47.
The basic premise of the governmental tort legislation of most of the states
is acceptance of tort liability as the general rule, subject to legislatively
defined exceptions.
Id. at 972.
64 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (1966) (enacted 1963).
65 S. Napolitano &. G. Kenny, The Status of Sovereign Immunity in New Jersey: A
Proposed Legislative Reform, 91 N.J.L.J. at 486 (1968).
66 Id. at 471.
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COMMENTS

The fear that large unanticipated impositions jupon public funds
will be required to satisfy tort damage claims is exaggerated; the
ready availability of liability insurance provides adequate protection at moderate cost which may be budgeted in advance ...
Modern notions of sound public policy reject the view that the
burden of loss should fall upon the person injured by the tortious
acts or omissions of public servants; on the contrary, it is deemed
better, as a rule, to distribute the private losses caused by the governmental enterprise over the public at large which is the bene67
ficiary of that enterprise.
Moreover, should insurance costs be an anticipated burden, the legislature may impose dollar limits on damages, 68 either as part of a comprehensive plan or by a statute specifically designed for that purpose.
Should the Willis ruling remain intact, a problem of determining
exactly which functions will be deemed discretionary and which will
be construed as ministerial may arise. The solution seems simple
enough until one is reminded of the governmental vs. proprietary
function confusion which tortured the courts and attorneys until recently. One guideline for the practicing lawyer is the trend of decisions
in other states utilizing the discretionary-ministerial dichotomy. The
availability of such a guideline provides an advantage for jurisdictions
that move more slowly.6 9 The line of New Jersey cases treating the
Van Alstyne, supra note 47, at 921.
See Van Alstyne, supra note 47.
Historically, one of the principal deterrents to reform of governmental immunity has been the fear that tort liability would impose intolerable burdens
upon public finances, diverting tax revenues from their designated purposes to
the detriment of the general welfare ...
The fiscal approach [with damage limitations embodied in immunity
statutes] assumes the validity of [such] fears . . . By providing a specific, albeit
essentially arbitrary, basis for fiscal planning and acquisition of insurance coverage, dollar limits avoid the risk of calamitously high judgments.
Id. at 970-71.
69 See, e.g., Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 465 (1961).
Although it may not be possible to set forth a definitive rule which would determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable for discretionary
acts of its officials, various factors furnish a means of deciding whether the agency
in a particular case should have immunity, such as the importance to the public
of the function involved, the extent to which governmental liability might impair
free exercise of the function, and the availability to individuals affected of
remedies other than tort suits for damages.
Id. at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99. See also Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167
N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
[W]e have long and consistently held that the courts would not go behind the
ordinary performance of planning functions by the officials to whom those
functions were entrusted.
Id. at 584, 167 N.E.2d at 65, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
67
68
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same distinction in the municipal area is also instructive. 70 One factor
to keep in mind is the possible propensity of the judiciary to find
liability even for what may be high level decisions.
The discretionary immunity is not always extended to its
fullest scope. For example, liability is often imposed for injuries
resulting from a dangerous condition of public property, even
though the condition may have gone unrepaired due to a discretionary decision by responsible officials to delay the work or divert
the available resources to other projects believed to deserve a higher
priority. 7'
CONCLUSION

It is felt here that P,T&L and Willis provide a foundation for
concepts of immunity based upon sounder principles than blind adherence to stare decisis. Hopefully, the apparently pending legislative
enactment will be one which "reflects (the) considerations of governmental integrity while affording substantial protection to those injured
by . . .a public entity.17 2 Since the King is alive and well in other
jurisdictions which abolished immunity, the prognosis is that he will
survive in New Jersey also.
Donald J. Maizys
70 An example is the case of Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541, 201
A.2d 726 (1964). There the court gave an indication of what it would recognize as a
discretionary activity:
Moreover, establishment of a general method of handling snowstorms is a
matter of planning. The decision adopting a procedure regulating when, where
and in what order of priority the equipment and personnel are to be used in
dealing with them is legislative or governmental in nature. Such decisions cannot
be subject to review in tort suits for damages, for this would take the ultimate
decision-making authority away from those who are responsible politically for
making the decisions. The extent and quality of governmental service to be
furnished is a basic governmental policy decision. Public officials must be free
to determine these questions without fear of liability either for themselves or for
the public entity they represent. It cannot be a tort for government to govern.
(emphasis added)
Id. at 550, 201 A.2d at 730-31. See also Note, Municipal Tort Liability: An Emerging
Standard in New Jersey, 1 Rutgers Camden L.J. 69, 84-85 (1969).
71 Van Alstyne, supra note 47, at 972 n.370.
.72 Material cited, supra note 65, at 471.

